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Abstract: The available road space (the scarce resource) is currently allocated by 
one’s willingness to sit in traffic jams. The costs incurred in sitting in traffic jams 
benefits no one – it is pure deadweight loss. The solution is to get the motorist to 
pay the social cost (marginal congestion cost). By pricing the cost of this traffic 
congestion in euro, this money could be collected and put to good use, perhaps 
on improving public transport.  
 
 
 
An economics professor at UCD used tell us that the problem 
with economic theory is that people keep ignoring it. 
Applying economic theory as a resolution to the problem of 
road congestion is a case in point. In 1776 Adam Smith 
published his classic, An inquiry into the nature and causes of 
the wealth of nations, which argued that individuals, left to 
follow their own self interest will do what is best for them 
and indirectly what’s best for society. 
The food we eat, the clothes we wear and the roofs over our 
heads don’t simply appear because the food producers, 
tailors and builders are altruistic, kind, caring and 
thoughtful human beings. They appear because people are 
motivated to make profits.  
However, in pursuing their own self-interests they 
unintentionally serve the public interest. It is as if they are 
guided by an “invisible hand” to promote (involuntarily) a 
public interest.  
Adam Smith’s idea of an invisible hand that connects private 
interests is at the heart of understanding political economy. 
Markets and market prices are more often than not the best 
way to organize economic activity and allocate scarce 
resources. 
However, even Adam Smith would acknowledge that 
sometimes markets don’t always promote the public interest 
and that governments need to intervene. One reason for 
market failure is what economists refer to as externalities – 
the effect that market activity has on the wellbeing of 
bystanders. 
A factory that doesn’t have to pay the cost of polluting the air 
is likely to produce too much and therefore pollute too 
much. The social costs of pollution are not included with the 
private costs (wages, rent, materials etc.) in the price of the 
product. In this case intervention is necessary to correct the 
market failure.  
Similarly, motorists will make a decision whether to take a 
particular journey based on the benefits of the journey and 
the costs (time spent travelling, petrol etc.). What they don’t 
consider is the additional costs they impose on others as a 
result of their decision to take that journey – they increased 
congestion. 
The available road space (the scarce resource) is currently 
allocated by one’s willingness to sit in traffic jams. The costs 
incurred in sitting in traffic jams benefits no one – it is pure 
deadweight loss. The solution is to get the motorist to pay 
the social cost (marginal congestion cost). By pricing eh cost 
of this traffic congestion in euro, this money could be 
collected and put to good use, perhaps on improving public 
transport.  
An argument put forward against road pricing is that roads 
are a public good and therefore considered “free”. However, 
roads cease to be a public good once they become congested 
and instead become a common resource. When a road 
becomes congested, one person’s use of the road reduces the 
available space for other users. 
It is difficult to charge road users for the space that they use 
up. Receiving the benefits of something without paying for it 
(including the social costs) is an example in economics of the 
free-rider problem. The problem for policy makers is to 
decide how much should a common resource should be 
used.  Avoiding congestion would involve the co-operation 
of all motorists.  
They could act together to reduce the number of cars on the 
road to a level that is efficient, i.e, to a level that would 
eliminate congestion. The problem is that each motorist 
does not have the incentive to co-operate because each 
individual motorist contributes only a small proportion of 
the congestion problem.  In economics this is the classic case 
of the tragedy of the commons’.  
To avoid this tragedy, policy makers could increase the price 
of complementary goods, e.g. petrol taxes. Petrol is 
considered a complementary good because cars cannot 
operate without petrol. By raising the price of petrol (via 
taxation) this reduces the demand for driving. But car 
ownership is, in economic jargon, a very inelastic good. 
Demand for driving is very insensitive to price. Therefore 
the fall in demand induced by petrol taxation is likely to be 
insignificant.  In addition the problem is with peak demand. 
Congestion usually happens at peak times in the mornings 
and evenings. But this type of variation in demand is not a 
problem. Petrol tax cannot be used to solve congestion 
problems – buying petrol during off-peak times can be used 
during peak periods. 
Urban planners and policymakers spend an inordinate 
amount of money, time and resources trying to find 
solutions to traffic congestion (top-down policies).  Often 
without reference to how market pricing can be used to 
eliminate congestion. 
Planners must surely realize that “supply-induced polices” 
(building more roads) has clearly failed to solve the twin 
problems of congestion and pollution. Building more roads 
simply leads to – drum roll – more cars. Knocking down all 
the buildings in Dublin and building roads would not 
eliminate traffic congestion.  
Road pricing works in theory and practice. Singapore, the 
first city in the world to introduce road pricing has no 
congestion problems and no traffic-induced pollution 
problems.  London’s experience has been a monumental 
success. There are fewer cars in the city, lower CO2 
emissions and higher levels of business transactions. 
Fellow egalitarians who oppose road pricing on the basis 
that it is regressive and that the “right” to drive should be 
distributed equally and not just based on one’s income 
should remember that road congestion is unfair to 
everybody not just to those who use the roads. However, 
since it is the case that higher income groups tend to drive 
more and use bigger cars than lower income groups, car 
owners could be given a driving permit that would give 
them a driving time each year. For those who drive less or 
decide not to travel into congested areas they could sell their 
balance to those who are willing and able to buy them – a 
distribution of income from rich to poor. 
